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Paper summary
The increasing importance of highly-skilled migration in times of so-called “skills shortages“
is leading to a growing interest in the determinants and characteristics of highly-skilled
migration. However, migration theory with regard to the highly-skilled is not well developed.
An important strand of literature that clearly serves for the derivation of empirically testable
hypotheses about the determinants of particular types of migrants is self-selection theory. This
theory has been adopted by Borjas (1987) for the analysis of the relation between the income
distribution and the skills of migrants. He concludes that a relatively more equal income
distribution in the host country vis-à-vis the source country leads to a negative self-selection
of migrants (i.e. the lowly-skilled will be particularly attracted) and vice versa. Borjas has
confirmed this hypothesis with data on immigration to the US. Chiswick (1999) and others,
however, have questioned these results.
Sample-selection biases may arise in single-country analyses and in all studies based on host-
country data, due to the impact of host-country specifics such as migration policy, network
migration, and the like. Due to a lack of internationally comparable data, however,
international empirical studies with data from the origin countries have not been undertaken
to resolve the dispute between Borjas and Chiswick. Furthermore, data on the intentions to
emigrate (as opposed to actual migration data) have the distinct advantage of being free from
the above-mentioned selection-bias problem. This paper sheds some new light on this
controversy by analysing the relationship between country-specific emigration propensities
and each country’s score on the Gini-Index of inequality. The 1995 International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted a survey on national identity, which gathers the
necessary data in a rich international microdata set.
The main result of this paper is that, ceteris paribus, a more egalitarian income distribution is
associated with lower emigration propensities, while income inequality does not have any
impact on the emigration propensities of highly-skilled persons. These results seem to
contradict Borjas’ prediction that highly-skilled should be particularly attracted by countries
which have relatively high returns to skills. Thus, the analysis presented in this paper is more
in line with the arguments put forward by Chiswick (1999) and others.
JEL Categories: J61, F223
I. Introduction
A well-established result in migration economics is the fact that migrants are not a random
sample of the population in the source countries. Processes of selection alter the sample on
both sides of the market. In the context of so-called “skills shortages” in many OECD
countries, the importance of highly-skilled migration is rising and many countries have
selectively opened their labour markets for highly-skilled immigrants.
1 Research on the
determinants of skilled immigration, however, is still largely lacking.
Among the migration theories, one that can clearly be used for the derivation of empirically
testable hypotheses about the determinants of particular types of migration is self-selection
theory. This theory has been adopted by Borjas (1987, 1994) to analyse immigration. A key
and much-disputed prediction of Borjas (1987) is that a more unequal income distribution in
the sending country will have a negative impact on the skills mix of migrants in the host
country (i.e., negative self-selection). Provided there is negative self-selection, a second
prediction of Borjas’ model is that a higher income inequality in the origin country will lead
to lower emigration rates. Chiswick (1999, 2000), however, argues that generally, positive
self-selection can be expected. In his view, a higher income inequality in the origin country
only attenuates positive self-selection.
Most studies which test for the self-selection of migrants rely on host-country data (see
Chiquiar and Hanson, 2002 and the overview in Chiswick, 2000). Such an approach is
problematic as specific host-country characteristics such as migration policy, migration
networks, historical links, geographical proximity, etc. are likely to bias immigration to these
countries.
2 For example, if a country's migration policy favours immigration of highly-skilled
labour, then testing for the selectivity of migrants with data from this country is not possible.
These are severe limitations. Earlier studies on the selectivity of migrants have tried to
counter these limitations by either studying internal migration (e.g. Gabriel and Schmitz,
1995; Bailey, 1993) or by focusing on the emigration of in-migrants (e.g. Constant and
Massey, 2002; Burda et al., 1998; Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Beenstock, 1996; Jasso and
Rosenzweig, 1988).
3 The aim of this paper is to overcome the above-mentioned limitations by
analysing multiple source-country data on emigration intentions. There are two main
advantages of such an approach: first, data on emigration intentions do not face the sample-
selection problems mentioned above. Furthermore, empirical tests of a theory that deals with
migration incentives, such as self-selection theory, should rely on emigration propensities4
instead of using immigration data.
4 Second, a multi-national analysis based on microdata is
possible. Although there are several studies based on source-country data, such as Chiquiar
and Hanson (2002), these only cover one source country and thus the generality of the
findings is limited. Our approach is valuable as it not only allows us to control for many
important socio-demographic factors, but also enables us to test the generality of the results.
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we show that positive self-selection can generally be
expected in international migration. Secondly, we demonstrate that positive self-selection
even holds for migrants coming from source countries from a high income inequality. The
main finding of our analysis is that a higher income inequality in the country of origin is
generally associated with a higher emigration propensity, while there is no impact on highly-
skilled persons.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section two presents Borjas’ self-
selection theory in a setting in which a migrant chooses between two prospective host
countries, taking Germany and the US as examples. Section three outlines Chiswick’s (1999)
modelling as a competing theory of self-selection processes. Section four presents an
alternative approach for testing self-selection, based on an international survey on national
identity. The results of the regressions are presented and discussed in section five. The paper
concludes with some implications of the results for the presumed emerging “competition” for
highly-skilled immigrants.
II. Borjas’ self-selection model in an international context
Borjas (1987) has used a model developed by Roy (1951) that explains the sorting of workers
among different employment opportunities to analyse the self-selection of migrants.
5 It
explains the skills level of migrants by the relative wage differentials (i.e., the relative returns
to skills) between sending and host countries. Provided that the correlation between skills in
the two countries is sufficiently high, a key prediction of Borjas (1987: 552) is that “[i]f the
income distribution in the sending country is more unequal [...], emigrants will be chosen
from the lower tail of the income distribution in the country of origin.” Those who enjoy
below-average earnings both in the source and in the host country are then defined as
negatively-selected immigrants.5
In contrast to this negative self-selection, positive self-selection occurs when the host
country’s earnings distribution is more dispersed. This effect arises because the source
country “taxes” highly-skilled labour and “insures” less skilled workers to a greater extent
than the host country. Importantly, neither differences in mean earnings nor migration costs
determine the type of self-selection, although they shape the size of the migration flow.
The principle of immigrant self-selection in an international context can also be depicted in a
graphical way. Figures 1 a) and b) show the cases of positive and negative self-selection.
6
These presentations expand Borjas’ (1996: 298) elaboration by allowing for two different
countries (Germany and the US), which “compete” for highly-skilled migrants. Germany has
a more “egalitarian” wage structure than the US, its curve is therefore somewhat flatter than
that of the US. In this case, the United States would always enjoy an advantage over Germany
in attracting highly-skilled labour.
(Figures 1 a) and b) around here)
However, this is still not the whole story for countries like Germany. In many European
OECD countries and particularly in Germany, the tax and benefit system ensures that the
payoff to skills is quite evenly distributed. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US has one of
the most progressive returns to skills in the OECD (see also Bell and Freeman, 1995).
According to the Gini-Coefficient, which proxies different relative returns to skills by
measuring relative income (although not wage) inequality, Germany has a very egalitarian
income distribution vis-à-vis the US.
7 Out of the countries for which data is available, only 14
have an even more egalitarian income distribution than Germany, mainly comprising other
EU countries and countries in transition. 41 countries have a relative income distribution
between that of Germany and that of the US, whereas only 32 have an income distribution
that is even more unequal than the US’s.
8 Therefore, a third situation has to be distinguished,
illustrated by Figure 1 c), which is probably also the most likely one.
(Figure 1 c) around here)
In this case, the income distribution in the source country is somewhere between that of the
US and that of Germany: whereas the latter would attract the lowly-skilled immigrants, their6
highly-skilled counterparts would migrate to the US. The widening of the wage gap with
increasing skills levels which occurs between Germany and the US points to a second
problem. The US will ceteris paribus be more attractive for particularly highly-skilled
workers than Germany, and Germany will in turn be particularly attractive for very lowly-
skilled foreigners, thereby facing adverse selection. The relative attractiveness of the US vis-
à-vis Germany increases with the skills level, making the problem most pronounced in the
case of the most valuable (i.e. highest-skilled) migrants.
Self-selection models implicitly assume that skills are transferable. However, perfect
transferability is rather unlikely, e.g. due to country-specific human capital. If skills are only
imperfectly transferable, the curves for the skills returns in the prospective host countries are
likely to flatten, ceteris paribus reducing the likelihood of positive self-selection. It is also
possible that the transferability is somewhat country-specific. For example, knowledge of
Japanese production-techniques may be transferable to countries that have industries that take
advantage of these techniques, directing positive self-selection within this migrant group
towards such countries.
An additional prediction of Borjas’ (1987: 551) self-selection model is that countries with
more income inequality should have lower emigration rates if there is negative self-selection
(i.e., if the host country has less income inequality than the source country). The reason
behind this is that the migration incentives of the most skilled decrease while the least skilled
will continue to migrate. Conversely, in the presence of positive self-selection, a higher
income inequality should be associated with higher emigration rates.
Borjas has tested these hypotheses with data on immigration to the US, by regressing
immigrant earnings and the emigration rate from the origin countries of US immigration on
relative skills differentials in the countries of origin. As a proxy for the relative skills
differentials, Borjas (1987: 545) uses the “ratio of household income of the top 10 percent of
the households to the income of the bottom 20 percent of the households”. His results seem to
support his model’s predictions on the impact of income inequality on migration.
III. Alternative models
Borjas’ results have been challenged by other studies on immigrant self-selection. Chiswick
(1999) argues that larger relative wage differentials in the origin countries do only imply a7
less favourable selectivity, i.e. negative self-selection is not likely to occur. In a recent paper,
Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) find support for Chiswick’s argument based on data on migration
from Mexico to the US.
The various models proposed by both Chiswick (1999) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) can
be interpreted as expansions of the human capital model, which was first proposed by
Sjastaad (1962). In Chiswick’s (1999) modelling, migrants tend to be positively self-selected
due to the presence of out-of-pocket costs to migration. The latter foster positive self-
selection, as direct migration costs have a shorter time equivalent (i.e. lower opportunity
costs) for the highly-skilled. Furthermore, Chiswick (1999) argues that ability is likely to
positively affect efficiency in migration, which reinforces positive self-selection. Borjas’
modelling assumes instead that time-equivalent migration costs are equal for all types of
migrants. In the presence of direct migration costs, a larger wage inequality in the country of
origin thus does not necessarily imply negative self-selection, but rather only a less favourable
self-selection.
9
We subsequently examine the dispute between Borjas, whose model predicts a negative self-
selection of migrants from countries with a very large returns to skills (i.e. earnings)
differential, and Chiswick and others, who argue that large income differentials do not
preclude positive self-selection.
10
IV. Data and methodology
We test the two alternative hypotheses by analysing the relationship between country-specific
emigration propensities and each country’s score on the Gini index on inequality. The 1995
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) conducted a survey on national identity, which
gathers the necessary data in an international microdata set. The survey covered 23 countries
and has a sample size of approximately 28,000 individuals. It allows for the identification of
socio-demographic characteristics of people with high emigration propensities, especially of
the skilled. This is particularly noteworthy as there are no international statistics on the
relative share of skilled migrants. Furthermore, all traditional immigration countries (USA,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand) participated in the survey as well as many EU countries,
including Germany. A key question in the survey is whether the respondent would be willing
to move to another country to improve his work or living conditions. We identified all8
respondents which answered “very willing” as people with a high emigration propensity. Of
course, this propensity is not necessarily associated with actual migration.
11 However, it
should be noted that self-selection theory is mainly concerned with “incentives” to migrate,
which does not necessarily correspond with actual migration (see also Chiquiar and Hanson,
2002). Therefore, the migration propensity might serve as a better proxy for an empirical test
of the theory than immigration, which is likely to be biased due to the impact of host-country
specifics such as migration policy, network migration, country-specific migration costs, and
the like. These biases are likely to be at work in single-country analyses and in all studies
based on host-country data – i.e., in basically all empirical tests of self-selection theory.
12
Furthermore, in a reply to a Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) critique on his 1987 paper, Borjas
(1990) acknowledges that selective emigration of the foreign-born (i.e., “on-migration”) is
likely to bias studies based on host-country data. Finally, it is generally assumed that
“intentions” are a monotonic function of the underlying variables motivating actual migration
behaviour. Intention data have also been used in other studies on self-selection, such as in
Burda et al. (1998).
13
Using microdata allows to control for socio-demographic characteristics. We run probit-
regressions with three groups, one including all surveyed persons and two comprising  the
sub-sample of the highly-skilled and the sub-sample of the respondents with medium and low
education.
14 By relying on the Gini index as a proxy for wage inequality, the paper follows
Borjas’ (1987) approach. Borjas, however, proxies skills differentials by income differentials.
Chiswick (1999) argues that these two differentials may only be poorly related. The analysis
presented here partly avoids this criticism, as we compare the sub-sample of highly-skilled
persons with all surveyed individuals (and with respondents having medium or low
education). A strong positive correlation between skills and income therefore suffices for the
validity of our approach. This, of course, is predicted by standard economic theory and
imposes a much less stringent assumption than the one underlying Borjas’ proxy.
A final important point is that we test a theory that is relative in nature with absolute data.
More specifically, according to Borjas’ theory, negative self-selection occurs when the
relative income distribution is more unequal in the source than in the host country. The ISSP
data set, however, captures migration intentions and has no information on the host country to
which each respondent implicitly refers to. Thus, it is conceivable that a large proportion of
e.g. Filipinos have the United States in mind, whereas Polish respondents implicitly refer to
Germany. Testing such a relative theory with absolute data is only possible when our set of
countries in principle comprises a reasonably closed system, i.e. the emigration intentions of9
most respondents refer to another country of the sample. As we have included all traditional
immigration countries and most Western European countries, we believe this to be a fair
assumption. Note that even if a kind of clustering in migration takes place, e.g. the Eastern
European countries refer to Germany and the Western European nations to the US, our
estimates will not be biased.
V. Empirical analysis
The country-specific Gini values are shown in the last column of Table 1. As it can be seen,
the Anglo-Saxon countries have a much higher inequality than Western Europe. Eastern
European countries have fairly diverging Gini values, ranging from below 20 in Slovakia to
almost 40 in Poland.
Table 1 also depicts the desired emigration rates, i.e. the percentage of respondents that stated
they would be “very willing” to move to another country in the 1995 ISSP.
(Table 1 and Figure 2 around here)
No clear pattern seems to exist. Surprisingly, many eastern European countries have very low
desired emigration rates. This result corresponds well with the relatively low actual
emigration rates from these countries that have been reported elsewhere.
15 Averaging the five
possible responses to the question “Would you be willing to move to another country to
improve your work or living conditions?” on the Lickert’s scale from 1 (“very unwilling”) to
5 (“very willing”) alters the picture somewhat. The results are shown in Figure 2. Still, there
is no obvious pattern. Now, however, the Philippines stand out as the country with the highest
emigration propensity, followed by Sweden. At first sight, Sweden’s high emigration
inclination appears puzzling. This points to an important difference between potential
mobility – i.e., emigration inclination – and actual emigration. The two need not to be
correlated in countries which are already at the top end of the income and/or human
development scale. It may well be that theoretically, Swedish citizens would be very willing
to move to other countries to improve their work or living conditions. In practice, however, it
might prove difficult for them to find such countries, as Sweden is already at the top end of10
both GNP per capita and of the Human Development Index. Furthermore, and more
importantly, it should be noted that Sweden joined the European Union in the year the survey
was conducted and Sweden was among the countries with the highest increase in
unemployment rates between 1992 and 1996. Thus, there might have been an increased
awareness of new opportunities abroad at that particular date.
Table 2 depicts sample-mean tests (t-tests) in order to establish the significance of country
differences in emigration propensities. There are apparently and significant large inter-country
differences in the emigration inclination, even between neighbouring countries such as, for
example, Sweden and Norway. In fact, only in very few and apparently unrelated bi-country
comparisons are the sample means not significantly different.
(Table 2 around here)
We subsequently ran a set of probit regressions, controlling for socio-demographic
characteristics. As Borjas’ migrant self-selection theory predicts fundamentally different
migration incentives for highly-skilled vis-à-vis lowly-skilled persons, the overall sample was
divided in two groups. The first group included only people with a university degree and the
second was comprised of the rest of the sample, i.e. people with medium or low education.
(Table 3 around here)
Standard migration theory predicts that young, highly-qualified, single males should be the
most mobile group.
16 In the base regression, we controlled for age, education, marital status
and gender. All of these factors had the predicted sign and were highly significant. The
positive impact of high education on the migration propensity is particularly noteworthy.
Unless other factors, such as income inequality, counterweight the impact of education, one
would generally expect positive self-selection. The results of the base regression are, to our
knowledge, the first empirical evidence for the positive selectivity-hypothesis of migrants
based on a multi-country analysis of source-country data.
In the highly-qualified group, only gender and marital status had a significant impact. This
result is underlined by the surprisingly small influence that employment status seems to have11
(column 2 of Table 3). Only students have a significantly higher migration propensity,
whereas the impact of unemployment is only at the margin of significance.
In column 3 of Table 3, we additionally control for foreign parents, knowledge of English,
and whether the respondent has lived abroad. These factors should mainly influence the
obstacles to migration by lowering both psychic and actual migration costs. Indeed,
knowledge of the English language and prior migration have a significant impact on the
migration propensity. Nevertheless, the three characteristics mentioned above have to be
interpreted with caution as they are likely to be highly correlated. In this regression, we also
had to exclude all English-speaking countries as well as Spain and Russia. In the latter two
countries, the question had not been posed, while inclusion of the former would have
obviously biased our analysis.
In Table 4, we run the first two sets of regressions again, now replacing the country dummies
by each country’s respective PPP-adjusted GNP per capita value and furthermore adding
country-specific Gini coefficients. In the full sample, the coefficients for the socio-
demographic characteristics (age, sex, level of education and marital status) confirm the main
results of migration theory. Now even unemployment fosters the migration inclination
significantly.
(Table 4 around here)
Even though we have been controlling for GNP per capita, the Gini-coefficient has a positive
and highly significant impact.
17 A higher income inequality thus leads ceteris paribus to
higher incentives to migrate. In Borjas’ (1987) analysis based on US immigration data,
however, countries with more income inequality had lower migration rates. Such a negative
coefficient is implied by the assumption of wealth maximisation if there is negative selection.
Vice versa, a positive coefficient can be expected if there is positive self-selection: the
migration incentives for the lowly-skilled increase while the highly-skilled will still migrate.
This appears to be the case in our analysis. We reconfirmed this result by running regressions
separately for the highly-skilled group and the medium- and lowly-skilled group. For the
latter sub-sample, a higher earnings inequality is indeed associated with a higher emigration
propensity, as predicted by wealth maximisation in the presence of positive self-selection.
1812
For the highly-skilled sub-sample, however, there is no significant impact of inequality on
migration propensity.
VI. Conclusions
Positive self-selection can be generally expected in international migration, even in the
presence of high income inequality in the country of origin. Our result that a high income
inequality does not seem to affect the emigration propensity of the highly-skilled contradicts
Borjas’ (1987) prediction that higher income inequality in the source country should lead to
negative self-selection. If we do not control for the per-capita GNP, the relationship even
becomes positive, i.e. a higher income inequality may even be associated with higher
migration propensities of the highly skilled. These results indicate that explanations relying
solely on income differentials may not suffice to adequately describe the migration behaviour
of the highly-skilled. The model seems to be too much ceteris-paribus based to explain a
complex phenomenon like (skilled) migration, as other factors such as language skills, prior
migration, nationality of parents, etc., intervene.
Our results in line with those of Chiswick’s (1999) and Chiquiar and Hanson’s (2002) models
of self-selection processes, who are based on a human capital model. They predict that
positive self-selection will even occur in countries with high inequality if migration costs are
lower for the highly-skilled, although positive self-selection may be weakened. Our findings
support these alternative models that are based on a human capital migration model.
19 We
found that a higher income inequality tends to foster emigration. The impact of income
inequality on the inclination to migrate, however, becomes insignificant in the highly-skilled
sub-sample. Importantly, however, there is no indication of a negative relationship, as
predicted by Borjas. Even when income inequality in the origin country is high, positive self-
selection can still be expected.
These results also have important implications for policies seeking to attract skilled migrants
using financial incentives, particularly since a competition for skilled migrants seems to be
currently emerging among OECD countries. Inter alia, tax incentives have been introduced to
attract highly skilled workers. In the Netherlands, for example, highly-skilled foreigners
benefit from a 30 per cent income tax discount for ten years, which was specifically initiated
to be a magnet for highly-skilled migrants. Even “egalitarian” Sweden has introduced tax13
incentives for highly-skilled foreign workers.
20 In France, stock option taxation has been
relaxed to make the country more attractive for mobile workers in the ICT sector.
21 In the US,
highly-skilled temporary immigrants are exempt from income tax for the first three years.
22 In
this context, it is of particular interest to determine which factors influence the location choice
and the supply of highly-skilled migrants, i.e. which persons find it worthwhile to migrate to a
certain host country.
If Borjas were right, countries with an equal income distribution would particularly attract
lowly-skilled people – regardless of the level of earnings (which, of course, still matters for
the overall size of the migration flow). This has important implications for zones of free
migration, such as in the wake of Eastern EU enlargement: countries with a very equal
income distribution, such as Germany and Sweden, would then attract the lowly-skilled,
whereas the highly-skilled compatriots of the latter would migrate to countries like the UK. In
light of our findings, however, countries with a rather equal income distribution need not per
se be concerned about attracting only lowly-skilled people. This insight also somewhat
weakens calls for tax incentives in order to “remain competitive” for highly-skilled migrants.
These will only have a level effect of attracting higher numbers of skilled people, not an
additional effect via the altered earnings distribution.
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Notes:
                                                
1  These countries include Germany and the UK; see OECD (2001a) for an overview of
recent developments in highly-skilled migration.
2  See also Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (2000).
3  However, the economics that determine the out-migration decision differ substantially
from those determining in-migration. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) argued that out-migration
intensifies the original selection. Chiswick (2000) concludes from a survey of various studies
that out-migrants are likely to be less favourably selected than the original migrants, whereas
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988) argued that the most skilled are likely to out-migrate.
4  Tidrick (1971) and Finifter (1976) were among the first to test for selection processes
using questionnaires on the inclination to emigrate from the US. A similar approach has been
taken by Burda et al. (1998) for analysing the on-migration of immigrants in Germany.
5  A fundamental assumption in self-selection models is that earnings increase with
skills.
6  In Borjas’ (1987) model, a third case is distinguished in which immigrants have
below-average earnings in the country of origin but enjoy above-average earnings in the host
country.  We exclude this possibility from our analysis.
7  This holds even if one controls for the distribution of skills, see Blau and Kahn (1996).
8  See World Bank (2001).
9  Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998) have developed a theoretical framework
incorporating differing returns to skills and migration costs against the background of
selective immigration law.
10   In this context, another strand of literature should be mentioned, the so-called “new
economics of migration”. Stark (1991), to whom this set of theories is due, has argued that
migration need not correspond to wage differentials. In his models, other motives such as risk
diversification and relative deprivation are the primary triggers for migration.
11  For an overview of the discussion of the use of intention data see Manski (1990).
12  A noteworthy exception of the lack of empirical studies with source country data is
provided by Chiquiar and Hanson (2002). However, their study only covers Mexican
emigration to the US.
13  Note that self-selection theory is a supply-side theory. In a similar line of reasoning in
the labour supply literature, Kahn and Lang (1991) have argued that work intentions should
be used rather than actual work.
14  Correctly, “skilled“ refers to the ability of performing certain tasks, while “qualified“
stands for educational attainment. As “abilities“ are difficult to measure, most studies assume
that the highly-skilled have at least tertiary education, e.g.  a bachelor’s degree or an
equivalent to this (see e.g. Winkelmann (2001) and Auriol/Sexton  (2001)). In effect, this
assumption thus justifies a somewhat interchangeable use of the terms “high-qualified”,
“highly-educated” and “highly-skilled“.
15 See, for example, the recent analysis of the International Organization for Migration
(2002) and Fidrmuc (2001).15
                                                                                                                                                        
16  See, for example, the overviews provided by Massey (1993) and Ghatak/Levine/Price
(1996).
17  This still applied after we additionally controlled for changes in unemployment rates
between 1992 and 1996, which also had a significant impact on migration inclination.
18  Note that this result is also in accordance with the relative deprivation assumption of
the “new economics of migration” by Stark (1991), see also Note 10.
19  However, our findings are also in line with the “new economics of migration”,
particularly with the assumption of relative deprivation.
20  See Mahroum (2001), who also provides other examples.
21  For a discussion of the role of stock option taxation in the competition for mobile
highly-skilled labour, see Liebig (2001).
22  See OECD (2001b), 190.Bibliography
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(a) Positive selection of immigrant flows, both to Germany and to the US
sn
both immigration to Germany
and to US beneficial
neither immigration to







(a) Negative selection of immigrant flows, both to Germany and to the US
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(c) Positive selection of immigrant flow to the US, negative selection to Germany
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Figure 1 c): Adverse selection of immigrant flows
                                                


















Canada (CDN) 12.0 17.9 15.2 20.1 34.7 2.5 (0.04) 1163 31.5
Great Britain (GB) 11.1 17.3 11.1 21.3 39.1 2.4 (0.05) 700 36.1
Ireland (IRL) 9.8 10.8 5.3 16.3 57.9 2.0 (0.05) 769 35.9
New Zealand (NZ) 7.8 20.5 17.3 19.0 53.5 2.5 (0.05) 770 43.9
United States (USA) 7.4 11.2 11.8 17.7 51.8 2.0 (0.04) 1034 40.8
Western European Countries
Austria (A) 4.8 7.5 4.0 17.5 66.3 1.7 (0.04) 732 23.1
Germany – East (D-E) 4.5 10.7 6.0 18.4 60.4 1.8 (0.06) 402 30.0
a
Germany – West (D-W) 8.6 17.3 8.2 26.7 39.2 2.3 (0.05) 883 30.0
a
Italy (I) 10.2 12.6 6.9 16.1 54.2 2.1 (0.05) 851 27.3
Netherlands (NL) 9.9 18.7 11.1 28.8 31.5 2.5 (0.03) 1520 32.6
Norway (N) 5.6 15.9 17.5 20.1 40.9 2.3 (0.04) 1041 25.8
Spain (E) 11.4 15.0 11.1 16.6 45.9 2.3 (0.05) 832 32.5
Sweden (S) 14.1 19.9 13.7 17.7 34.6 2.6 (0.05) 930 25.0
Eastern European Countries
Bulgaria (BG) 12.8 20.3 7.1 31.6 28.2 2.6 (0.05) 719 28.3
Czech Republic (CZ) 3.9 7.7 7.3 19.3 61.8 1.7 (0.04) 794 25.4
Hungary (H) 3.2 6.9 7.8 17.1 65.0 1.7 (0.04) 695 30.8
Latvia (LV) 3.4 10.4 8.2 19.3 58.7 1.8 (0.05) 647 32.4
Poland (PL) 9.6 13.5 11.4 25.3 40.3 2.3 (0.04) 1053 39.9
Russia (RUS) 4.0 9.3 6.7 18.4 61.6 1.8 (0.03) 1150 38.7
Slovakian Rep. (SK) 10.2 15.1 9.5 23.4 41.9 2.3 (0.04) 983 19.5
Slovenia (SLO) 3.9 9.2 9.3 29.7 47.9 1.9 (0.04) 774 26.8
Others
Japan (J) 2.1 3.7 10.2 25.1 58.8 1.7 (0.03) 843 24.9
Philippines (RP) 9.4 18.7 15.6 38.2 18.1 2.6 (0.04) 970 46.2
Note: underlying question: "Would you be willing to move to another country to improve your work or living conditions?"
a In the corresponding World Bank (2001) statistics, the Gini-value is only depicted for Germany as a whole.21









































































Note: average is based on the scale ranging from 1 ("very unwilling") to 5 ("very willing")22
Table 2: probabilities of equal means (t-tests)
RP S BG CDN NL NZ GB DW E SK PL N I USA IRL SLO DE LV RUS CZ A H J
RP 0.77 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S 0.65 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BG 0.41 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CDN 0.30 0.34 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NL 0.93 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NZ 0.39 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GB 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DW 0.99 0.84 0.68 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E 0.85 0.70 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SK 0.83 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PL 0.77 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
I 0.55 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
USA 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRL 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SLO 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DE 0.99 0.51 0.28 0.07 0.05 0.03
LV 0.42 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.01
RUS 0.55 0.11 0.07 0.03













































































































































































































N 20165 2828 17337 19527 2770 16757 13172 1778 11394












Note: the dependent variable can have two possible values: 1 – very willing to emigrate, 0 - others. The regressions included country dummy
variables. For the sake of clarity, these coefficients have not been reported here. Regressions conducted for individuals aged 20-60. Standard
error in parenthesis.
a dummy variables
b reference category: middle education
c reference category: nonemployed
d all English-speaking countries were omitted (USA, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Great Britain). In addition, due to missing variables,
Spain and Russia were excluded.
e the pseudo-R
2 measure is that of McFadden (1973)
*/** significant at the 5%/1% level, respectively24


















































































































































N 20255 2839 17390 20165 2828 17337 19527 2770 16757












Note: the dependent variable can have two possible values: 1 – very willing to emigrate, 0 - others. The regressions included a PPP-adjusted
GNP per capita variable. Regressions conducted for individuals aged 20-60. Standard error in parenthesis.
a dummy variables
b reference category: middle education
c reference category: nonemployed
d the Gini values are taken from World Bank (2001)
e the pseudo-R
2 measure is that of McFadden (1973)
*/** significant at the 5%/1% level, respectively25
Appendix:
Table A1: variable definitions
variable definition
desired emigration equal to 1 if respondent is "very willing" to move to another country in
order to improve his living conditions; 0 otherwise
low  education equal to 1 if respondent’s highest education is primary schooling; 0
otherwise
high education equal to 1 if respondent has a university degree; 0 otherwise
full-time employment, part-time employment,
student, unemployment
dummy variables based on respondent’s self-classification
foreign  parents equal to 1 if at least one parent is not a citizen of the country
concerned; 0 otherwise
has lived abroad equal to 1 if respondent has ever lived in a foreign country; 0 otherwise
speaks English equal to 1 if respondent reported to speak English well and/or regularly
at home; 0 otherwise
gini country gini values for the year 1995/96 according to World Bank
(2001)
PPP-adjusted  gnp country PPP-adjusted GNP values for the year 1995 according to
World Bank (1998)




























Note: due to the listwise deletion of variables the number of observations does not correspond to that of the regressions in
tables 3 and 4. Sample restricted to individuals aged 20-60.